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CoMMENTS

MAsTER AND SERVANT -THE FILLING STATION OPERATOR AS AN
INDEPENDENT CoNTRACTOR - Under the press of modern concepts of
responsibility of business units 1 it becomes necessary to re-examine the
relation between the corner filling station and the big oil company that
uses it as a means of getting its products before the consuming public.
The factual situation is usually this: the operator may own the station, or
may lease it from the oil company; the oil company invariably owns
the equipment, such as gas pumps, tanks, and tank trucks, which it
leases to the operator; by a sales contract the operator binds himself
to sell only the petroleum products of the oil company, with or without permission to sell accessory lines such as automobile tires and tubes;
strict retail price control is reserved by the oil company, which sells
products to the operator at a stated di:fferential below the retail price;
the oil company furnishes all advertising and decorates the station in its
own distinctive colors; the oil company reserves the right to terminate
the relationship at any time. Recent legislation, such as that providing
for workmen's compensation, old age insurance, unemployment insurance, and chain store taxation, as well as the common-law rule of respondeat superior, require a determination whether this operator in his
relation to the oil company is deemed to be an independent contractor.
Vicarious liability for tort hangs on the employment relation 2 ( which
is replacing the "master and servant" terminology in the books) ; the
workmen's compensation statutes carry their own definition of coverage,
yet the common-law concepts of the employment relation remain the
essential basis for the statutory liability; 3 the unemployment and old
age insurance coverage is treated in the same manner, depending upon

Laski, "The Basis of Vicarious Liability," 26 YALE L. J. I05 at III (1916).
For a historical background, see BATY, V1cAR1ous LIAl3ILlTY (1916).
3 1 CAMPBELL, WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION, § 430 (1935); I ScHNEIDER,
WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATloN, zd ed., § 19 (1932).
1

2
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the legal relationship of employer and employee.4 The chain store
taxes are generally levied on "stores owned, operated, maintained, or
controlled)) by one legal entity,5 a phraseology which involves a relationship that at common law would be defined in terms of "employer
and employee." With this in mind, is our filling station operator an
independent contractor leading the "good life," or is he the final outpost of big business? 6 Before answering this question, let us examine,
first, the common-law rationales of the employment relation and,
second, the socio-economic rationale.
I.

The common-law doctrine of respondeat superior is generally considered a form of absolute liability; not the strict liability of Rylands
v. Fletcher,1 but liability imputed to the employer for tortious acts
of his employees regardless of fault of the employer.8 There have been
many suggested rationales for the imposition of such liability; Baty
enumerates nine,9 of which the more important seem to be control,
profit, and satisfaction.10 Of these, Baty says the last is the real reason
for the rule, that the damages are taken from a deep pocket.11. How4 Texas Co.- v. Wheeless, (Miss. 1939) 187 So. 880. The Treasury Regulations
under the Federal Social Security Act have adopted the common-law control test of
the employment relation: ''an employee is subject to the will and control of the employer not only as to what shall be done but haw it shall be done. In this connection,
it is not necessary that the employer actually direct or control the manner in which the
services are performed; it is sufficient if he has the right to do so." TREAS. REG. 91,
art. 3 (1936). For three reasons it is necessary to determine the e.xistence of the
relation: to determine whetlier the employer is liable for unemployment compensation
ta.i:es, to determine the amount of the tax (ii: depending upon the number of "employees"), and to determine who should receive the benefits.
6 The following states have some form of graduated chain store tax: Alabama,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania (see note 24,
infra), South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin
(expired by its own terms, July 1, 1939).
·
6 Steffen, "Independent Contractor and the Good Life," 2 UNIV. Cm. L. REv.
501 at 510, 518 (1935).
1 L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
8 Steffen, "Independent Contractor and the Good Life," 2 UNiv. CHI. L. REv.
501 at 504 (1935); HARPER, TORTS, § 291 (1933); AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 219
(1933).
"Unknown to the classical jurisprudence of Rome, unfamiliar to the mediaeval
jurisprudence of England, it has attained its lu."\.-uriant growth through carelessness
and false analogy, and it cannot but operate to check enterprise and to penalize commerce." BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 7 (1916).
9 BATY, VxcAmous L1AB1LITY 148 (1916).
10 "ControP' gives the notion of fault; "profit'' presents the proposition that he
who benefits by the use of a servant should be responsible.
11 BATY, V1cAR1ous LIABILITY 154 (1916).
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ever, the courts· have given lip service to the control rationale; 12 this
seems to be an attempt to correlate the doctrine with the general rule
of tort liability, that of fault. Yet where there is no control in the sense
of actual direction of the actions of the tortfeasor-employee the rule is
still applied, with the reason given as "right of control"; 13 and it is
possible that the most exemplary employer may be held liable for a
tortious act by his employee which he has used every precaution to
prevent. Moreover, this rationale of the doctrine, namely, control by
the employer, has been adopted by the courts as a test of the existence
of the employment relation. This is illustrated by the Restatement of
the Law of Agency under "Liability of Principal to Third Person;
Torts," where the definition is given: 14
"A servant is a person employed to perform service for a.nother in his affairs and who, with respect to his physical conduct
in the performance of the service, is subject to the other's control
or right to control."
The Restatement then proceeds to outline factual elements to consider
in determining the existence of that control.15 Justice Cardozo stated the
control test in this manner: 16
"On the one side there is a.n intimacy of control and on the other
a fullness of submission that imports the presence of a 'sovereign,'
1 z Gulf Refining Co. v. Rogers, (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) S7 S. W. (2d) 183;
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Linham, (Miss. 1935) 163 So. 839; Jones v. Standerfer, 296
Ill. App. 145, IS N. E. (2d) 924 (1938).
13 Arkansas Power & Light Co. v, Richenback, 196 Ark. 620, II9 S. W. (2d)
515 (1938).
14 I AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 220 (1933).
16 "In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent
contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered.
"(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work;
"(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
"(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
"(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
"(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the place of work for the person doing the work;
"(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
"(g) the method of payment, whether by time or by job;
"(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
and
"(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of
master and servant." I AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 220 (1933).
16 Glielmi v. Netherland Dairy Co., 254 N. Y. 60 at 63, 171 N. E. 906 (1930).
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as the master, we are reminded, was sometimes called in the old
books••••"
In general, there are two means with which one can achieve the
performance of services: through anindependentcontractorand through
an employee. No liability is imputed to the principal for the actions
of the independent contractor.17 Necessarily, then, from the viewpoint
of legal engineering the independent contractor concept serves the
purpose of limiting the responsibility of a principal,18 and the employment concept is a means of expanding it. In terms of the control test
of the employment relation, the independent contractor is differentiated
by saying that as to him the principal controls only results, not the
means of performing the services.19
It is believed that control, giving effect to the notion of fault, does
not tell the whole story. For in terms of the effect of economic enterprise on society the control rationale has place only in the sense of a
factor to help prevent harm to innocent third parties-the theory is
that imposition of liability. on that basis will in some vague manner
prevent the recurrence of such harm. The real problem would seem
to be that of best caring for those harms sociologically,2° for in the long
run, the determination of the employee and independent contractor is
a part of the larger problem of determining the socio-legal position
of economic enterprise in relation to organized society-the extent and
means by which society should make it responsible for its actions and
effect on society. The administration of harms, or risk of harm, would
seem to be the ultimate rationale of respondeat superior; and its elements are risk avoidance, risk prevention, risk shifting, and risk distribution.21. It is believed that the control test of the courts is not an
11 Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Linham, (Miss. 1935) 163 So. 839; Jones v.
Standerfer, 296 Ill. App. 145, 15 N. E. (2d) 924 (1938); HARPER, ToRTS, § 292
(1933); subject to exceptions not here relevant.
Professor Morris believes the rule as to exemption from liability to third p~rties
is undesirable. Morris, "The Torts of an Independent Contractor," 29 h.L. L. REV.
339 at 345 (1934).
18 Steffen, "Independent Contractor and the Good Life," z UNiv. Cm. L. REV.
501 at 512 (1935).
•
19 Texas Co. v. Wheeless, (Miss. 1939) 187 So. 880; Barnes v. Indian Refining
Co., (Ky. 1939) 134 S. W. (2d) 620; Washington Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernst,
199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718 (1939).
Professor Leidy calls attention to the desirability of a test for the independent
contractor in terms of "independent calling'' rather than control. Leidy, "Salesmen as
Independent Contractors," 28 MxcH. L. REV. 365 (1930).
20 Smith, ''Frolic and Detour," 23 CoL. L. REV. 444 at 456 (1923).
21. Risk avoidance is the expression of the desire to secure all persons against the
risk of serious loss from tortiQus acts; risk prevention embodies stimulation toward the
reduction of such losses by preventing their occurrence; risk shifting presents the
administrative problem of passing the loss on to society; risk distribution represents the
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entirely satisfactory test upon which to base the responsibility of economic enterprise, and that in order effectively to secure that. responsibility a fuller test, giving effect to the other elements of the rationale,
should be used.
2.

It is easily recognizable that respondeat superior is only one phase
of the responsibility of economic enterprise to society-that of responsibility to innocent third persons for torts. A part of that problem is
responsibility to society through the administration of the risk of harm
to the human instruments used. At common law the fellow servant
rule prevented satisfactory adjustment of the risks to employees.22
The modern workmen's compensation, old age, and unemployment
insurance statutes have returned responsibility to economic enterprise.
It is now recognized that the burden of human loss in industry should
be charged to the expense of production rather than be allowed to fall
on that person least able to carry it, the individual employee.28 It is
believed that here, as well as in determining the responsibility to third
persons, the socio-legal administration rationale and its elementsrisk avoidance, risk prevention, risk shifting, and risk distributionform a better guiding light than the notion of fault incorporated in the
orthodox test of control used to determine the employment relation for
the purpose of the coverage of those statutes.
Chain store taxes are levied, ordinarily, on legal entities owning,
operating, maintaining, or controlling more than one "store." This
coverage is very similar to the employment relation in that when the
independent contractor relation exists stores are not subject to the tax.
The independent contractor concept as applied to this situation would
seem to be the means of determining the extent of responsibility of
economic enterprise for support of the state. Its function here is entirely different from that of measuring responsibility to third persons
for tort and to employees. Logically then, being based upon a different
philosophy, the test of the employment relation should depend upon
different factors. It must not be forgotten that legal concepts are only
valid so long as they serve to meet their purpose in legal thinking; in
administrative problem of getting an insurable coverage in order to cut down the
e>..-pense of passing it on to society. See Stevens, "The Test of the Employment Relation," 38 Mic:a:. L. REV. 188 at 199 (1939).
22 The justification for liability without fault in the case of employees is the
same as where third persons are involved. Smith, "Frolic and Detour/' 23 CoL. L. REV.
444 at 457 (1923). It seems clear that if it had not been for the development of the
fellow servant rule, there might have been liability v,Tithout fault at common law and
no need for the liability acts and workmen's compensation statutes.
23 Laski, "The Basis of Vicarious Liability," 26 YALE L. J. 105 at 126 (1916);
l CAMPBELL, WoRKM:EN's CoMPENSATION II (1935); Ives v. South Buffalo R. R.,
201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (19II), contains a full discussion of the philosophy·of
the workmen's compensation statutes.
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other words, it is the function of the concept "employer and employee"
that should define its terms and scope. The justification for graduated
chain store taxation takes two different directions; in one case it derives
constitutionality by means of a classification differentiating between the
one-merchant retail establishment and the group retail establishments
on the basis of the benefits of multiple unit retailing methods; 24 the
other direction justifies a classification made for the purpose of the public safety and welfare, a distinction based on harm to society 25-taxation
for social control.26 The courts have not been clear as to which of these
theories is the foundation of the tax. In either case a determination of
the existence of chain store methods, the "doing business" through multiple retail outlets, should lead to an application of the tax regardless of
the outward form of the relation. In such a situation the benefits of
chain store distribution are had without the burdens, and the undesired
harm exists.21 A test for the coverage of the chain store tax should take
into consideration both the benefits and the harmful effects of chain
store distribution.28

3.

With that as background, is our :filling station operator truly the
self-reliant independent merchandiser he purports to be? The courts
are clearly in agreement to this extent, that the form of the relationship
and the name given it by the parties will not be conclusive.29 From
24 State Board of Tax Commissioners 'of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51
S. Ct. 540 (1931); Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 53 S. Ct. 481 (1933). Contra,
American Stores Co. v. Boardman, 336 Pa. 36, 6 A. (2d) 826 (1939), holding the
Pennsylvania statute unconstitutional under the state constitution.
25 Compare Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U. S. 87, 55 S. Ct. 333
(1935), where it was alleged that the tax would compel the complainant to withdraw
from the state. See also Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S.
517, 53 S. Ct. 481 (1933).
26 To a degree, all taxation has social repercussions, but this taxation is more in
the nature of a prohibition. The argument made against social and economic control
through taxation is that taxation deals exclusively with results rather than causes, that it
is a crude method of control incapable of use with fine discrimination, and consequently,
likely to result in harm. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, FACING THE TA.""r PROBLEM
130 (1937).
21 Bedford v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 104 Colo. 424, 91 P. (2d) 475 (1939).
28 These functions of the employment relation concept are suggestive rather tha11
exclusive. As to the possibilities of constitutional complications, see Crowell v. Benson,
285 U. S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932). The same determination is necessary for minimum wage and maximum hour regulation. See Commonwealth v. Weinfield's, Inc.,
(Mass. 1940) 25 N. E. (2d) 198.
29 Vicarious liability for tort: Gulf Refining Co. v. Rogers, (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)
57 S. W. (2d) 183; Anderson v. Foley Bros., no Minn. 151, 124-N. W. 987 (1910);
Nelson v. American Cement Plaster Co., 84 Kan. 797, n5 P. 578 (19n). Chain store
tax: Ma."rn'ell v. Shell Eastern Petroleum Products Corp., (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) 90
F. (2d) 39, cert. denied 302 U.S. 715, 58 S. Ct. 34 (1937). Workmen-'s compensation: Glielmi v. Netherland Dairy Co., 254 N. Y. 60, 171 N. E. 906 (1930);
Utility Coal Co. v. Rogez, 170 Okla. 264, 39 P. (2d) 60 (1934); Nestle's Food Co.
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that point one goes off the deep end into a confusing mass of factual and
legal differentiation. In determining the coverage of the chain store
tax, it is generally concluded that filling stations are "stores" for the
purpose of the tax. 30 The weight of the cases indicates that an oil company distributing its products by means as outlined in the first part of
this comment is subject to the tax.31 Keeping in mind the purpose of the
tax, it is believed that such a result is justifiable because of the great
economic control exerted over the operation of those retail outlets 32
and because the advantages of chain-store methods are achieved by the
oil company through that economic control.33 A federal three-judge
district court has expressed it this way: 34
v. Industrial Commission, 205 Wis. 467, 237 N. W. II7 (1931); but compare York
v. Industrial Commission, 223 Wis. 140, 269 N. W. 726 (1936), strongly criticized
in IZ Wis. L. REv. 219 (1937).
3
°Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U.S. 87, 55 S. Ct. 333 (1935);
Midwestern Petroleum Corp. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 206 Ind. 688,
187 N. E. 882, 191 N. E. 153 (1933). Contra, Wadhams Oil Co. v. State, 210
Wis. 448, 245 N. W. 646, 246 N. W. 687 (1931).
This is further borne out by the fact that thirteen states have specifically exempted
filling stations from their chain store tax: Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Wisconsin (see note 5, supra). C. F. Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659, 259
N. W. 352 (1935), holds that such an exemption is not arbitrary and unreasonable.
Montana and North Carolina subject filling stations to a specialized chain store tax.
31 While no two oil companies will contract with operators in exactly the same
terms, it is believed that these fact situations approximate the hypothetical case presented in the first part of this comment: Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294
U.S. 87, 55 S. Ct. 333 (1935); Midwestern Petroleum Corp. v. State Board of Tax
Commissioners, 206 Ind. 688, 187 N. E. 882,191 N. E. 153 (1933); Gulf Refining
Co. v. Fox, {D. C. W. Va. 1935) II F. Supp. 425, affd. per curiam, 297 U.S. 381,
56 S. Ct. 510 (1937); Ashland Refining Co. v. Fox, {D. C. W. Va. 1935) II F.
Supp. 431; Ma."avell v. Shell Eastern Petroleum Products Corp., (C. C. A. 4th, 1937)
90 F. (2d) 39, cert. denied, 302 U. S. 715, 58 S. Ct. 34 (1937).
32
As illustrations of the control obtained through lease and sales contracts, see
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Ford, 255 Mich. 105, 237 N. W. 378 (1931), and Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Skinner, 140 Kan. 413, 36 P. (2d) 968 (1934). It is easy to perceive
the tremendous economic pressure the oil company could bring to bear on the operator
to keep him in line from the mere fact of the power of termination of the agreement
in the hands of the oil company.
33
In effect the oil company takes the profits and losses, as the operator receives only
a commission on products sold since the price to him depends upon the retail price as
fixed by the oil company. Justice Cardozo lists the chain store methods as: larger capital,
standardization in equipment and display, superior management, more rapid turnover,
uniformity in store management, special accounting methods, a unified sales policy
coordinating the diverse units. Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U. S. 87,
55 S. Ct. 333 (1935). It can be seen that these methods are present in the supposed
fact situation.
·
34
Gulf Refining Co. v. Fox, (D. C. W. Va. 1935) II F. Supp. 425 at 429,
affd. per curiam, 297 U. S. 381, 56 S. Ct. 510 (1937).
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"It may be conceded that it [ oil company] does not exercise full
control over all of the actions of the dealers in a strict legal sense,
but its actual control is so effective that little room is left for
independent action on their part, while full enjoyment of the
advantages inherent in a chain store system on its part is ensured."
While adding up and weighingthe facts in any particular case will be
extremely difficult, the determination of the sufficiency of economic
control over the distribution point such that the oil company could be
said to reap the benefits of chain store methods will be simplified by
keeping in mind the purpose of the statute.85
In determining the applicability of workmen's compensation statutes to this situation, the courts seem to have been completely guided
by the control test, giving no consideration to the function and philosophy of those statutes. As to results, a few more decisions have found
sufficient control to form the relationship than have found an independent contract.36 However, as said before, such an approach through
control does not give full sway to the function of the employment
relation for the purpose of charging up to economic enterprise, in order
better to distribute the cost, losses which experience has taught are
inevitable. The filling station operator and his one or two employees
could hardly be said to be socially efficient in the absorption of such
losses.81
The function of the employment relation for the purpose of determining the coverage of old age and unemployment insurance provisions would likewise seem to be that of administration of risks: to
allow a maximum coverage of the benefits, to allow enforcing agencies
to operate economically and effectively, and to reduce to a minimum
the expense and inconvenience burdening the persons affected by the
statutes. Because of the convenience in administration of the tax and
the benefits, the employment relation was selected as the measure of
35 Determinative facts seem to be retail price control, power of t.ermination of the
sales agreement) and power to withdraw the equipment necessary to the functioning
of the filling station These powers derive their significance from the fact that the
operator sells only the products of the oil company as contrasted vnth the usual price
control mechanisms in the case of the ordinary merchandiser selling products furnished
by many diffei;ent producers or wholesalers.
86 To the effect, on more or less similar facts, that there was sufficient control:
Angell v. White Eagle Oil Co., 169 Minn. 183, 210 N. W. 1004 (1926); State e:x:
rel. Woods v. Hughes Oil Co., 58 N. D. 581, 226 N. W. 586- (1929); Crowder
v. Compensation Commission, IIS W. Va. 12, 174 S. E. 480 {1934). Contra, Horst
~- Southern Idaho Oil Co., 49 Idaho 58, 286 P. 369 (1930).
81 Economically, it might be said that the employee is one who in relation to the
size of his employing unit is only a single individual in an economic combination;
while the independent contractor is one who maintains an economic unit comparable
in size, relatively, with that which he serves.
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coverage.ss There have been few actual cases concerning the responsibility of the oil company for the filling station operator. However,
there has been a flood of administrative opinions on the point, based in
general upon the test of control, and usually indicating that the filling
station operator is within the coverage of the statute.39 There have been
some recent cases dealing with the relation, for this purpose, between
the oil company and the filling station operator's big brother, the bulk
plant operator. These indicate that the bulk plant operator is not an
employee but is an independent contractor.40 Such results can perhaps be
best distinguished on the basis of the entrepreneur test ( a test of the employment relation based on the profit rationale of vicarious liability),
although the courts speak of control. The bulk plant operator with his
larger organization and greater capitalization has a better opportunity
to spread losses and insure against them; he seemingly occupies a socioeconomic position of independent contractor more justifi.edly than the
filling station operator/'38 See STEvENs, CovERAGE OF THE OLn-AGE BENEFIT PROVISIONS OF THE
SocIAL SECURITY ACT 42 et seq. (1939) (unpublished master's thesis on file University
of Michigan Law Library).
39 In two Internal Revenue Bureau opinions under TREAS. REG. 90, art. 20 5
(1936), and TREAS. REG, 91, art. 3 (1936), the operator was held an employee on
facts similar to the hypothetical situation, and was held an independent contractor
where the oil company did not control retail prices and did not forbid the selling of
competitive products. S. S. T. 267, 17 INT. REv. BuLL. 402 (1938) and S. S. T.
266, 17 INT. REv. BuLL. 401 (1938).
State unemployment insurance: California, lnterp. Op. C 3008-102 (12-30-38),
2 CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SER.VICE, (Cal.) 1f 1330.03; Connecticut, not an
employee when there is no retail price control, Commr. Dec. No. 92-C-38, ibid.
(Conn.), 1f 1401.02; Georgia; not an employee where the operator may sell competitive merchandise and there is no retail price control, Letter Opinion of General
Counsel, Jan. 20, 1938, ibid. (Ga.), 1f 1400.03(8); Wisconsin, the control test is
determinative, Comm. Dec. No. 38-C-101 and Tribunal Decisions, Nos. 39-A-147,
39-A-148, 4 ibid., Wis.) 1f 1330.04.
<l 0 Texas Co. v. "Wheeless, (Miss. 1939) 187 So. 880; American Oil Co. v.
Wheeless, (Miss. 1939) 187 So. 889; Indian Refining Co. v. D~an, (D. C. lli.
1940) 31 F. Supp. 455; Barnes v. Indian Refining Co., (Ky. 1939) 134- S. W.
(2d) 620.
""- A good many of the state unemployment insurance statutes contain provisions
creating a presumption of employment and setting up standards to be met to constitute an independent contractor relationship. These embody three elements: freedom
from control of employer, services to be performed outside the usual place of the
employer's business or usual course of his business, and services by an individual customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business. These
are considered to be cumulative. For a typical provision, see Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws
(Supp. 1938), § 4151 (490) (A) (V).
To the effect that such a provision was nothing more than the common-law· test
of independent contractor, see Washington Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernst, 199Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718 (1939), holding "newsboys" independent contractors.
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In the tort cases it is again impossible accurately to plot the respective positions of the filling station operator and the oil company. In
some of the cases the filling station operator has been examined and
found wanting as an independent contractor capable of being responsible for his own torts. The extensive economic and 1contractual control
exerted by the oil company has led to the imposition of liability on the
oil company by respondeat superior through application of the control
test.4 z But there seems to be an equal amount of authority the other
way.48 For the purpose of tort liability the courts seem to differ over
the extent to which they will be influenced by the factors surrounding
the relationship de hors the written contract between the parties-the
ultimate test being control over means and methods used as contrasted
with control over results.4i, The myriad factual combinations possible
with varying degrees of economic control complicate the prqblem of
forecasting the result in any particular situation.
Keeping in mind the function of the rule of respondeat superiorthat of risk avoidance, risk prevention, risk distrib~tion, and risk shifting, in order to relieve third persons of inevitable losses incident to
economic enterprise--it would seem desirable to hold the oil company
liable in every case where the loss may be said to be an incident to the
oil business-(in this case consumer distribution)-provided that such
· imposition will not unduly interfere with that business. It is believed
that in the ordinary case of petroleum distribution at retail the filling
station operator in the instant situation is not the right party to absorb
the risks of that retail distribution. The oil company is in a better
position to insure against the risk and pass it on to the consumer as a
legitimate cost to society in the price of his product. Economic enterprise is no longer a mere matter of private concern; in achieving the
maximum public good, economic enterprise is given great freedom and
many benefits, but in return it must be held responsible to society for
its activities even though it attempts to insulate itself from such responsibility. While the only attempt by legislation to achieve this result
through statutory definition of the independent contractor has been
read out by judicial construction,45 it is believed that the common-law
4 z Gulf Refining Co. v. Huffman & Weakley, 155 Tenn. 580, 297 S. W. 199
(1927); Greene v. Spinning, (Mo. App. 1931) 48 S. W. (2d) 51; Buchholtz v.
Standard Oil Co., 2II Mo. App. 397, 244 S. W. 973 (1922) {bulk plant operator);
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Pierce, 132 Okla. 167, 269 P. 1076 (1928) (bulk plant
operator).
48 Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Linham, (Miss. 1935) 163 So. 839; Texas Co. v.
Brice, (C. C. A. 6th, 1928) 26 F. (2d) 16444 Compare Gulf Refining Co. v. Rogers, (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 57 S. W. (2d)
183, with Jones v. Standerfer, 296 Ill. App. 145, 15 N. E. (2d) 924 (1938).
45 Washington Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d)
718 (1939), .see note 40 supra.
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system is sufficiently :flexible and responsive to reach the results desired.
The rules and principles behind the concept of the employment relation
have been worked out 46-it is a problem of applying them to a particular fact situation understandingly.
William F. Andersen

-«4 As Justice Holmes has stated, a "body of law is more rational and more civilized
when every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end which
itsubserves••••" Hou.tES, CoLLECTED LEGAl. PAPERS 186 (1920), reprinting "The
Path of the Law," IO HARV. L. REv. 457 at 468 (1897).

